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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The dissenting opinion in the instant case relies heavily on the decision
in Stowell v. Santoro'9 which prevented village trustees from convicting
the petitioner (police chief) of a bribery charge after a previous acquittal
on the same specification. r1ie dissenters are fearful that a grant of retrial
power to the police department could result in endless vexation for members
of the force. The majority of the court makes a weak attempt to
distinguish the facts of the Stowell case but is primarily concerned with
the necessity for a decision on the merits. Since whatever evidence was
offered at the first hearing was directed to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it is difficult to support this emphasis.
However, since a court of law will relax the res judicata doctrine
to further the ends of justice,20 administrative agencies, with their greater
flexibility,' should have the same power. Even in a criminal case, the
refusal of a witness to testify may result in a mistrial so that the defendant
can be retried.22 Removal proceedings are not criminal actions, 23 although
they are penal in nature, 24 and it appears illogical to extend to defendants
in a departmental trial greater protection from jeopardy than a criminal
proceeding might afford them. It is further suggested that ". . . in
proceedings for the removal or discharge of a policeman the protection
of the public is a matter of paramount importance, exceeding perhaps
the individual interests of the policeman concerned."-"
Fred Patrox
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DOING BUSINESS TEST
Defendants, out of state owners of a Florida orange grove, listed the
grove for sale with a real estate broker in Florida. In a suit for the broker's
of their judicial acts, except as cualified by statute.
necessary implication

This function arises by

to serve the statutory policy .

.

..

The denial

to

such tribunals of the authority to correct error and injustice and to revise
its judgments for good and sufficient cause would run counter to the public
interest . . . . The power of correction and revision, the better to serve
the statutory policy., is of the very nature of such governmental agencies.

(Italics supplied.)
19. 256 App. Div. 934, 9 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2nd Dep't 1939).
20. Universal Const. Co. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 68 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1953).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No. 14,858 (C. C. D. Mass.
1815).
23. Sullivan v. Mun. Ct. of Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 78 N.E.2d 618 (1948);
McGillicuddy v. Monaghan, 201 Misc. 650, 112 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.) aff d on
other grounds, 280 App. Div. 144, 112 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dept 1952).
24. Fort Wayne v. Bishop, 228 Ind. 304, 92 N.E.2d 544 (1950).
25. City of Gary v. Yaksich, 120 Ind. App. 121, 127, 90 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1950).

CASENOTES
commission the defendants were sered under the statute' authorizing
substituted service upon a non-rcsident by service of process on the
Florida Secretary of State. Held, tile defendants' listing of the grove
with a Florida broker was not a "transaction or operation connected with
or incidental to" defendants' business in Florida within the statute, but
that defendants' purchase of the grove and the listing of it for sale did
amount to engaging in a "business venture" within the statute and thus

service upon defendants was valid. State cx rel. Weber v. Register. 67
So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
It is generally held that process of a court of one state cannot
reach into another, and that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident
is unavailing to give in personam jurisdiction to courts of the state
issuing the process.2 There must be actual service within the state upon
3
the defendant, or upon one authorized to accept service for him.

As early as 1878, the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff' recognized
the right of the states to pass legislation providing for service upon
non-resident defendants under certain situations.
In response to this
view of the court, some 40 states enacted statutes providing for substituted
service in actions arising out of transactions within the state by
non-residents.6
In 1918, a statute of this type was declared invalid by the Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Flexner v. Farson. 7 The language of the
court in this case has had the effect of checking the use of substituted
service upon non-residents through service on their agent in the state

where business is transacted.9

However, departures from the holding
non-resident motorist

in Flexner v. Farson may be found in the (1)

1. FLA. SlAT. § 46.17 (1951) ". . . operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a
business or business venture, in the State of Florida, . . . in any action, suit or
proceeding . . . arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental
to such business or business venture .... "
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Mr. Justice Field speaking for the court:
Neither do we mea to assert that a State may not require a nonresident
entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts
enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the State to
receive service of process . . . or to designate such place that service may be
made upon a public officer designated for that purpose ....
6. Culp, Process In Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a
State, 32 Mincn. L. REv. 909 (1934).
7. 248 U.S. 289 (1918).
8. Mr. Justice Holmes distinguished the analogy of substituted service upon
corpcraticns by exclaining ,that ". . . the consent that is said to be implied in
such cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the state could
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation
as a condition to letting them in .....
le went on to point out that the state
could not so exclude the individual.
9. Gulp, Process In Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a
State, 32 Mien. L. Rev. 909 (1934); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing
Business Within The State, 32 HARV. L. REv. 871 (1919).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
cases,' (2) cases involving the sale of securities within a state, 1 and
(3) cases involving the conduct of operations within the state where such
operations are "fraught with danger."' 12 These cases, however, were
predicated on police power grounds.'3 They did not establish that the
"doing of business" in itself confers in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents.
14
In 1945, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington
re-examined the fictional approaches 5 upon which the validity of the
substituted service statutes rested and formulated a new approach for
supporting actions in personam against foreign corporations. The court
established a new test consisting of minimum contacts with the forum state
so that the maintenance of a suit would not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.

By the use of minimum contacts the

court offers a basis for further jurisdictional expansion beyond the traditional
"doing business" concept and while anything said about jurisdiction over
individuals in International Shoe is necessarily dictum, the rationale
(minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice) seems also applicable
to the non-resident individual or unincorporated business unit.' 6
While the court in International Shoe was silent on the traditional
basis for obtaining jurisdiction of "doing business,"' 1 nonetheless, some
courts relying on the "doing business" test have taken cognizance of the
court's "rninimum contacts" broader view and have apparently proceeded
on the basis that "doing business" in itself, regardless of the nature of
the business, is sufficient ground for in personam jurisdiction.',
But
regardless of this development, it does not appear that a majority of the
courts have as yet substantially expanded the "doing business" concept
beyond its traditional confines in regard to the question of which activities
amount to "doing business.'" 8
10. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

11. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1934).

12. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944).
13. For an interesting extension of police power, see Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa.
D. & C. 61 (1938).
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. The fictions are the presence theory as stated in International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); the implied consent theory as stated in Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1855).
16. See discussion in Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S.W.2d 212 (1948);
McDaniels v. Textile Workers Union of America, 254 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1952).
17. Yet the court apparently did away with the rule established in Green v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry, 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Minnesota Ass'n v. Benn,
261 U.S. 140 (1923), that mere solicitation is not doing business. For a recent
case rejecting the mere solicitation rule see Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339

U.S. 643 (1950).

18. Interchemical v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't
1948); Pine v. McConnell, 298 N.Y, 27, 80 N.E.2d 137 (1945).
19. American Casualty Co. v. Harrison, 96 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. Ark. 1951)
(nonresident subcontractor who agreed with contractor to perform remodeling on
store-doing business); Kaffenberger v. Krerner 63 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Pa. 1944)

CASENOTES
In the instant case, the court distinguished between "a business"
and a "business venture" and reasoned that the purchase of the grove
was a "business venture" and that the listing of it amounted to a
"transaction connected with or incidental to the business venture." In
upholding the constitutionality of Florida Statutes Section 46.17, the court
apparently rejected the argument that for the statute to be constitutional
the "business" or "business venture" engaged in must involve hazard,
health or similar matters20 which traditionally have been regulated under
the police power. In conclusion the court cited and quoted International
Shoe,2 1 with its "minimum contacts" language.
It does appear, as was contended by the dissent, 22 that the court in the
instant case gave an excessively broad interpretation to the term "business
venture" in light of what has classically been held to be "doing business. '23

(advertising and goodwill operations-not doing business); Pine v. McConnell, 298
N.Y. 27, 80 N.E.Zd 137 (1945) (Ohio partnership represented in New York by
domestic and foreign sales agents-doing business); O'Hagan v. Caballero, 52 N.Y.S.2d
863, aff'd without opinion, 269 App. Div. 981, 59 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1945)
and Debrey v. Hanna, 182 Misc. 824, 45 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Surr. Ct. 1941) (mere
solicitation is not doing business). Contra: Miller v. Swan, 176 Misc. 607, 28 N.Y.S.2d
247 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941). See Smith v. Cook, 43 Pa. D. & C. 608 (1941); Stafford
v. Wood, 234 N.. 622, 68 S.E.2d 268 (1951) (fact that nonresident unincorporated
labor union had affiliated local union within state does not show that union was
doing business); Alward v. Green, 245 P.2d 855 (Utah 1952) (performer who had
power of attorney from nonresident defendant, a person engaged in scheduling
performances for various performers in order to enable him to cash checks received
for his own services is not doing business in state for defendant).
It has been generally accepted that to constitute doing business the activities
must be substantial, continuous, and regular as distinguished from casual, single, or
isolated acts. Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949),
However, some recent cases appear to hold
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 947 (1950).
the opposite. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d
664 (1951) (jurisdiction over a foreign corporation may be acquired by virtue of a
single act, a tort, committed within the state). For a stautory expansion of jurisdiction
consistent with the approach in International Shoe see, Johns v. Bay State Abrasive
Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950) (upholding the validity of a Maryland
on any cause of
statute extending jurisdiction over foreign corporations ".
action arising out of a contract made within this state or liability incurred for acts
done within this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing or has done
business in this state .. . ." [Italics supplied], While the court admitted that
the acts of solicitation of defendant would not amount to doing business, they were
sufficient to make defendant amenable to local suit under the statute). Could not
the same theory, under an appropriate statute, apply to nonresident individuals having
such minimum contacts?
20. Cochran v. Lewis, 118 la. 536, 159 So. 792 (1935) (nonresident motorists);
Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4,133 So. 609 (1931)(the sale of securities to the public).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. See Stem, Conflict of Laws, 9 MIAMI L.Q. 209, 214-216 (1953).
23. What constitutes doing business. In the case of an individual, as
inthe case of partnerships or other unincorporated associations . . . and in
the case of corporations . . .doing business isdoing a series of similar acts
for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise
accomplishing an object or doing a single act for such purpose with the

intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts.

§ 22 (1942).
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AIIAMI LAW QUAIRI'ERLY
It is perhaps unfortunate

that the otherwise valid statute was distorted

so as to include the prcscnt fact situation, but it may also be possible
to reconcile the court's reasoning in view of
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington. 4

the

broad rationale

in

Eugene Parker
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Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged tortious conduct of defendant

in inducing the Sovereign Republic of Peru to issue scrip certificates to
the current holders.

The bonds were received in exchange for an original

bond issue. field, defense that adjudication of claim would require court
to pass upon validity of act of a sovereign foreign government, was good.
Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., 125 N.Y.S.2d 900

(Sup. Ct. 1953).
All cases agree that where the law of the situs of the transaction is
statutory or involves judicial constructions of statutory law, the courts of
the forum will follow such law and determine the rights of the parties
b that law.' Thc earliest American judicial opinion in point was made
2
by the illustrious authority on international law, Justice Marshall.
Although in Underhill v. Hernandez,3 the court might have rested its
decision on the ground that there is no individual liability abroad for acts
performed by persons in the exercise of governmental authority within
their own states, the broader rule, enunciated that international law
requires each state to respect the validity of sovereign state acts, in the

sense of refusing to permit its courts to sit in judgment on the legality
or constitntionality of an act of a foreign state, has been followed in
4
innumerable cases.
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
t, Supreme Council, C.K.A. v. Logsdon, 183 Ind. 183, 108 N.E. 587 (1915);
Njus v. Chicago M. St. P. Ry., 47 Minn. 92, 49 N.W. 527 (1891); Lane v. Watson,
51 N.J.L. 186, 17 At]. 117 (1889).
2. Hudson v. Cuestier. 4 Cranch 293 (U.S. 1808).
3. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
4. E.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Company, 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (The fact that
property seized and sold by the authorities of a foreign government belonged to an
American citizen not residing in the foreign country at the time, does not engllower
a court of this country to reexamine and modify their action); Bernstein v. Van l-uvghen
Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947)(New York District court had
no power to determine plaintiff's claim which was: that by means of duress Nazi
officials compelled plaintiff in Gernany to transfer property to a Nazi designee and
that defendant, a Belgian Corporation acquired property with punitive notice of duress.);
Union Shipping and Trading Co. v. United States, 127 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Courts of another foreign power will accept as lawful official acts of another foreign
sovereign and will not undertake to examine the validity under the local law.); Banco
de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940)
(Federal courts will not examine the acts of a foreign sovereign within its own
borders in order to determine whether those acts were legal tinder the municipal

